During the Latin American crisis of the 1980s and the Asian crisis in 1997, the IMF channeled assistance to developing nations in exchange for austere economic policies to set right the balance of payments. The World Bank has provided long-term development assistance to poorer countries, sometimes at deeply discounted interest rates. With many of these countries now able to access private credit markets, and even provide financing to developed nations, how should these international institutions change to fit the new circumstances? And how should the members themselves change? Does it make sense, for example, for the U.S. to retain its veto power in the IMF? The IMF famously told Indonesia to raise interest rates in 1997; will it be allowed to dictate terms to Portugal and Spain without EU interference?
Senior Fellow, Milken Institute; Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
Dean, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley
Senior Fellow, Milken Institute; Group Managing Director and Chief Global Strategist, TCW Group Inc.
Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics, Stanford University; George P. Schultz Senior Fellow in Economics, Hoover Institution