background image
92
The Milken Institute Review
justice, could hardly have been worse. The
prosperity of modern China's urban elite has
always come at the expense of rural peasants,
who shared little of the gains associated with
rising productivity in manufacturing and ser
vices. As a result, the difference between rural
and urban living standards has always been
large ­ and is still widening today. And, of
course, the collapse of the medical coopera
tives only added to the sense that rural areas
had been left behind.
Don't misunderstand: many urbanites also
lost ground in the process of liberalization.
Before the economic reforms, urban workers
weren't paid much, but they got a lot of ser
vices (including medical care) as part of their
compensation. Once stateowned enterprises
were subject to market pressures and had to
compete with private companies, all bets
were off.
The unchecked spread of SARS in 2003 hu
miliated the Chinese government by revealing
just how hollow the health care system had be
come. And in 2005, Beijing officially acknowl
edged that the system was beyond repair.
Health care was once again declared a funda
mental responsibility of the state, and the cen
tral government embarked on the grand proj
ect of restoring universal access ­ now for a
population of 1.3 billion.
Actually, efforts to build the New Rural
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) had
started in 2002, with local governments again
put in charge. But this time around, local ad
ministrators knew that health care was a cen
tral government priority. In 2003, only 9.5
percent rural residents were covered by
NRCMS. Five years later, the figure had
reached 91 percent.
The NRCMS initially provided insurance
coverage for catastrophic illness and expanded
gradually from there, with households, local
governments and Beijing sharing the cost.
Primary Medical Insurance, the equivalent of
the NRCMS for urban residents, was re
launched in pilot programs in 2007.
the long march (cont'd)
While the principle of governmentsponsored
universal health care is now back in place, the
operational structure has yet to be worked
out. For example, it is unclear how insurees
will make premium payments or receive reim
bursement for outlays: China lacks the infra
structure ­ a wellfunctioning tax system, an
electronic payment system with wide cover
age, or even a reliable postal system ­ to make
this simple.
By the same token, the government's com
mitment to delivering services to the poor, es
pecially those in remote areas, has yet to be
tested. In the 1970s, when China was a wretch
edly poor nation, even minimal services went
a long way toward improving the quality of
life. Today, China faces the subtler problems
of deciding the breadth of services and level
of subsidies that should be offered to those
who can't afford to pay.
For the moment, Beijing seems set on
shaping the system to deliver equality of ac
cess to health care ­ a far more conservative
principle than say, equality of health out
comes or equality of expenditures. Even so,
i n s t i t u t e v i e w
T
he unchecked spread of
SARS in 2003 humiliated
the Chinese government
by revealing just how
hollow the health care
system had become.