Milken Institute Review 2Q10 Page 88

The Milken Institute Review

that established earlier by the Muslim Broth-
erhood in Egypt.

Al Qaeda does not fit the club mold: it

does not provide social services to members.

How has Al Qaeda protected itself sufficiently
from defection to carry out attacks on high-
value targets?

One possibility is that it recruits operatives

among clubs, drawing on a network of club
members who can vouch for potential opera-
tives. Another possibility is that Al Qaeda ex-
tends that club network by recruiting within

affiliated kinship networks, as appears to have
been the case for bin Laden's driver. Yet an-
other method, apparently in use in Iraq, is to
send foreign recruits who have not signaled
commitment on suicide attacks; that way they
have little time to be exposed to information
that would make them defection risks.

constructive counterterrorism
In 1973, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat had a ter-
rorism problem. The campaign of hijacking
and hostage-taking, and the spectacular at-
tack on athletes at the Munich Olympics, had
exposed his cause brilliantly to the world.

These bloody acts had also made recruitment

and political extortion much easier. Now, hav-
ing achieved international standing, further

violence threatened to undermine the new

image Arafat sought to project. The PLO was
being vilified as a bloodthirsty terrorist orga-
nization just when he wanted to become the
foremost statesman for the Palestinian cause.
It was now critical to somehow keep his cadres
of accomplished terrorists under control.

Arafat and his deputy, Abu Iyad, offered

the hundred or so Black September operatives
a generous outside option: an apartment in
Beirut, $3,000, a gas stove, a refrigerator and a
television. Best of all, they recruited a hun-
dred lovely young Palestinian women to the
cause. If an operative married and had a child
within a year, he qualified for a $5,000 bonus.

These incentives worked marvelously. The

Black September organization was retired

and has not been heard from since.

In a nutshell, clubs can be weakened by

taking the opposite tactic by improving
outside options. Even men with a history of
horrible violence respond to domestic incen-
tives, however mundane these may seem.

fighting back

The benign activities of religious clubs

strengthen their violent capabilities, but that
also has a wonderful implication: govern-
ment can limit the lethality of terrorist clubs
by countering the tactics that clubs use to in-
sulate themselves from defection.

First, enhance outside options for rebels

and potential rebels.

That is to say, provide

the basic prerequisites for good jobs in the le-
gitimate economy: thriving markets and
quality educational opportunities. Anything
that enhances the labor-market opportunities
of potential defectors tightens the defection
constraint that rebels face on terrorist activi-
ties, making it easier for the government to
bribe conspirators into defection.

Second, compete directly with the rebels in

social service provision.

The southern suburbs

of Beirut are bomb-scarred and riddled with
bullet holes marking three decades of civil
war and invasion. These are also bursting
with a majority Shiite population, having ab-
sorbed refugees and migrants from the Shiite

villages of South Lebanon in much the same
way that Sadr City in Baghdad absorbed eco-

lubs can be weakened by

taking the opposite tactic --

by improving outside options.