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76
The Milken Institute Review
under his leadership. Al-Banna and his fol-
lowers raised money and built a mosque, and
then two schools (one for boys and one for
girls) as well as a social club.
The Brotherhood organized youth groups,
charities, trade unions and night schools for
workers. Eventually they even owned factories.
Al-Banna's organization expanded to 15
branches by 1932, when he relocated the head-
quarters to Cairo; and to 300 by 1938, with a
membership estimated at between 50,000 and
150,000. By 1949 the Brotherhood's 2,000
branches throughout Egypt included between
300,000 and 600,000 members.
The Brotherhood filled a demand for edu-
cational, cultural, social and medical services.
Yet a club is not a government ­ to motivate
members, it must be prepared to expel them
for shirking in their work and exclude non-
members from access to services.
The Brotherhood established a tiered mem-
bership structure by 1935. Lower-tier members
paid dues, held a membership card and had ac-
cess to the social service network and mosques.
At higher tiers, the Brotherhood required more
commitment, including an oath of allegiance,
Koranic studies and physical training. This
structure allowed the organization to select
suitable candidates among the large pool of
lower-tier members who sought services, then
train and indoctrinate them. Once selected and
prepared, higher-tier members could be en-
trusted with more sensitive jobs.
For the first decade, the Brotherhood re-
mained apolitical. That changed when two
political currents merged into a perfect wave
of opportunity. The first was the 1936 general
strike in Palestine, a rebellion of Arabs against
both the British ­ who governed Palestine
under a mandate from the League of Nations
­ and Jewish settlement. The rebellion gave
the Brotherhood a chance to show solidarity
with an anti-imperialist movement without
actually endangering themselves by challeng-
ing British control in Egypt.
The second was the terribly unpopular
collaboration of the Wafd Party with the Brit-
ish. The Wafd Party had previously gained
widespread support by waving the banner of
Egyptian nationalism, so its implicit accep-
tance of British rule was considered a betrayal.
In 1941, the Brotherhood seized the opportu-
nity, running candidates in elections and call-
ing for both social reform and British with-
drawal. The British responded by banning the
party and arresting its leaders.
Yet by this time the Brotherhood was diffi-
cult to suppress. Its broad membership base
made it resilient to the loss of leaders. The or-
ganization easily weathered the storm. The
British soon went back to concentrating on
the war effort and released the Brotherhood
leaders.
That organizational base would prove crit-
ical in surviving the next, more severe, round
of repression. Sometime around 1939 the
Brotherhood leadership had reluctantly es-
tablished a militia, the "Secret Apparatus," in
response to internal pressure from more mili-
tant leaders. After the end of World War II,
the Apparatus began attacking British and
government targets. Egypt responded by le-
gally dissolving the Brotherhood in December
1948. The Apparatus took revenge later in the
T
he Brotherhood filled a demand for educational,
cultural, social and medical services.