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43
Second Quarter 2010
reu
te
rs/ria
no
v
os
ti
uses for capital than their inefficient Russian
counterparts. The government's apparent in-
tent was to use foreign banks to provide fi-
nancial intermediation services on the basis
of free-market principles rather than have the
country's wealth frittered away through cor-
ruption and ineptitude.
For a time, the result was rapid growth, re-
duced unemployment and fiscal stability as
envisioned in Putin's Russia Inc. model. How-
ever, when oil revenues dropped and private
capital inflows atrophied, the consequences
of this odd hybrid economic strategy became
all too apparent.
Russia had, in effect, wasted a decade in
which reform might have made the domestic
financial system more efficient and resilient
to external shocks. With the loss of access to
private credit, domestic or foreign, during the
global crisis, only the state had the resources
to support demand. And while the govern-
ment possessed humongous financial re-
sources and wielded unchecked authority, it
lacked the competence to implement an ef-
fective stabilization plan. As a result, the
country's economic contraction has been
much greater than that of most countries.
The effect on Russia's growth prospects be-
came increasingly apparent once the oil-price
declines of late 2008 stripped away the facade
of success. The government had focused dis-
proportionate wealth and attention on the big
conglomerates that it could and did control.
In the process, it had neglected small- and
medium-sized enterprises ­ or, more to the
point, it had neglected the reforms of private
capital markets and the legal system that were
needed to fertilize the ground for their growth.
This reality is particularly ominous, since
smaller firms have played a leading role in the
transition of the more successful former So-
viet economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
what next?
Winston Churchill's characterization in 1939
of Russia as "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery,