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22
The Milken Institute Review
dysfunctional relationship with America. But
if China signaled a change of heart ­ either
because it feared taking big losses on its hold-
ings of Treasury bonds or because it decided
that the Chinese economy had reached the
level of diversification to make do without
U.S. export markets ­ investors would rush
for the exits.
Most disconcerting is the prospect that
China, or some other large creditor in Asia or
the Persian Gulf, might decide to use our fi-
nancial dependence for strategic advantage.
The Chinese, for example, might use their lev-
erage to demote the United States from the
ranks of the financial superpowers, figuring
the political gains were worth the costs of
losses on its bond holdings and temporary
disruption in its export markets.
paying the piper
We might look to history for analogies. My fa-
vorite: In 400 BC, Dionysius of Syracuse (a
Greek colony on Sicily) was proving to be fis-
cally irresponsible. He liked parties, gold and
palaces (not to mention costly military ad-
ventures), and eventually found himself un-
able to pay his debts. He commanded his citi-
zens, on pain of death, to turn in their
one-drachma coins. He then stamped them
as two-drachma coins and repaid citizens
with the debased currency. Other profligate
rulers achieved similar ends by shaving metal
from the edges of coins or by diluting gold
with base metals in order to expand the
money supply.
In their wonderful compendium of bud-
get-disaster stories, Reinhart and Rogoff
found that, through history, expanding the
money supply ("monetizing the debt") was
the favored response to a debt crisis. There
are less crude ways of doing this than the
method chosen by Dionysius. And while the
Federal Reserve would, of course, not will-
ingly give up its ability to contain the money
supply as a means of maintaining price stabil-
ity, it might not have a choice.
The alternative, default on debt payments,
would be a disaster for the member banks of
the Federal Reserve System since they hold
their reserves in Treasury securities. So default
would very likely cause a systemic financial
market collapse. Ironically, the "riskless asset,"
rather than subprime mortgages or other
high-risk investments, would be the culprit.
While creating money "works" in the lim-
ited sense that it makes it possible to pay off
government creditors, the cost of the result-
ing inflation should not underestimated. All
owners of assets that paid returns in fixed
amounts of dollars (including all U.S. finan-
cial institutions) would experience a decline
in wealth. Indeed, financial institutions would
suffer much greater losses than in the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis, and the insolvent federal gov-
ernment would be powerless to help them.
The "wealth effect" of depreciating asset hold-
ings would significantly cut domestic con-
sumption, compounding the recessionary
impact of the tax increases and spending cuts
that would be necessary to cope with the bud-
get deficit.
Since most business contracts create obli-
gations in dollars and lack provisions for ad-
justments for inflation, many firms would
suffer huge losses and many would fail. More
generally, the economy would become far less
efficient at delivering the goods and services
that people value most because the price sig-
nals that drive resource allocation would lose
their utility.
Whether we defaulted on the debt explic-
itly, or implicitly through inflation, further
borrowing would become impossible or pro-
hibitively expensive. Washington would thus
suddenly need to start paying bills upfront.
c ata s t r o p h e